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The Future of Environmental Law and Complexities 
of Scale: Federalism Experiments with Climate 
Change under the Clean Air Act 
Hari M. Osofsky  
INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the Clean Air Act (―CAA‖) has served as an 
experiment in environmental governance models. Numerous books, 
articles, working papers, and public commentaries have dissected the 
CAA and proposed reforms.
1
 Although often viewed as weaker than 
 
  Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2008–2010; 
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, 2010–. This Article has been greatly 
enhanced through the dialogue at the New Directions in Environmental Law Symposium hosted 
by Dan Mandelker, Dan Tarlock, and the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. I 
also would like to thank Nicholas Albu, Nicholas Bianchi, George Davis, Crystal Doyle, Leigh 
Anne Faugust, David Gundlach, Christopher Hirsch, Sheri Hiter, Miles McCoy, and Simran 
Rahi for their very helpful research assistance, and Joel Christensen, Emily Zoellner, and other 
editors of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for their excellent editing of the 
Article. This project was made possible through research support from Washington and Lee 
University School of Law’s Francis Lewis Law Center. As always, I tremendously appreciate 
the love, support, and patience of Josh, Oz, and Scarlet Gitelson. 
 1. For a few examples of the extensive commentary on the Clean Air Act, see 
CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR POLLUTION (1998); GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE 
SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 
1995); CLEAN AIR ACT: INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS (James P. Lipton ed., 2006); THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004); 
CLEAN AIR LAW AND REGULATION (Timothy Vanderver, Jr. ed., 1992); T. H. TIETENBERG, 
EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006); Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism 
Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008); John P. 
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); 
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Thomas D. Peterson, Adam Rose & Dan Wei, The New Climate 
World: Achieving Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control 
through State Planning Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
767 (2009); Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach, Developing a 
Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates 
Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (2008); Douglas R. 
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some of the other statutes being analyzed in this symposium, the 
CAA has achieved some successes that have been emulated, such as 
in its cap-and-trade programs highlighted in Professor Buzbee’s  
Article.
2
 As importantly, the CAA has had to be flexible in 
responding to our evolving understandings of environmental 
problems. Whether through amendments or new regulatory regimes 
under existing provisions, the statute has served as a key mechanism 
in the U.S. federal government’s efforts to respond to complex 
environmental challenges.
3
  
This Article focuses on the CAA’s efforts to grapple with 
complexities of regulatory scale as an illustration of the new 
directions in environmental law that are the focus of this symposium. 
Air moves around over time, which interconnects the local with the 
international and the past with the future. This Article uses the 
example of disputes over CAA regulation of motor vehicles’ 
greenhouse gas emissions to illustrate how multiscalar clean air 
regulation should evolve in light of the changing demands for 
environmental law outlined by Professor Tarlock in the Introduction 
to this symposium.
4
 It argues that for environmental problems that 
cross-cut levels of governance, flexible coordination and conflict 
mechanisms are critical. Future efforts at clean air regulation, 
whether through the CAA or additional statutes and other governance 
mechanisms, should incorporate what I have elsewhere termed 
―diagonal‖ regulatory thinking.5 Such approaches bring together 
multiple actors within (the horizontal) and across (the vertical) levels 
of government to create innovative governance strategies. 
 
Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A Defense of Minimum Federal 
Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67 (2001); Jamie Gibbs Pleune, Note, Do We CAIR 
about Cooperative Federalism in the Clean Air Act?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 537 (2006).  
 2. See William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for 
Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
33 (2010).  
 3. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 4. See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Then And Now, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
1 (2010).  
 5. See Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
International?]; Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for 
the Obama Administration, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (Feb. 3, 2010 draft) [hereinafter 
Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/4
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The Obama administration Environmental Protection Agency 
(―EPA‖) is moving rapidly under its CAA statutory authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicle emissions.
6
 As it does 
so, two disputes that arose during the second Bush administration 
frame its efforts. Specifically, the Obama administration has been 
working to implement the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which resulted from states and cities suing the 
EPA for failing to use its authority under the CAA to regulate motor 
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions.
7
 Simultaneously, the Obama 
administration has granted California’s request for a waiver to 
regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gases more stringently than the 
federal government in conjunction with establishing a ―National 
Program‖ to harmonize federal and state motor vehicle greenhouse 
gas emissions.
8
  
These disputes and their resolution represent an exciting moment 
in the Clean Air Act’s history as the statute evolves to address a 
complex environmental challenge. But their mix of conflict and 
cooperation also highlights the multiscalar environment in which 
environmental statutes are currently implemented. Both disputes 
reflect complex interactions among the federal government, states, 
and cities; current efforts at cooperation often involve active 
engagement by many stakeholders. While these interactions are not 
entirely new under the CAA—the statute has long served as an 
example in scholarly and policy federalism discourse
9—the 
 
 6. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,494 (codified Dec. 15, 2009 at 40 C.F.R. 
ch. 1) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding]; Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 
(May 7, 1020) [hereinafter Final Rule]; see also Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, 2009 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC., No. 00377 (May 19, 2009). 
 7. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007); Endangerment Finding, supra 
note 6. 
 8. See Final Rule, supra note 6; Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the 
Administrator of the EPA (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Presidential_Memorandum_EPA_Waiver/; Press Release, EPA, EPA Grants California GHG 
Waiver (June 30, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac852573 
5900400c27/5e448236de5fb369852575e500568e1b!OpenDocument. 
 9. See sources cited supra note 1. 
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regulatory demands posed by climate change raise critical issues 
about the future of multiscalar governance.
10
 
This Article contributes to the symposium’s dialogue by 
examining the ways in which these conflicts over new applications of 
the CAA signal future directions for environmental law. The Article 
does not attempt to provide specific policy prescriptions for cross-
cutting motor vehicle regulations, a project which I am pursuing in 
another article;
11
 rather, in line with the symposium’s goals, it 
sketches a conceptual map for new directions indicated by these 
regulatory battles. Part I introduces the ways in which the CAA 
grapples with issues of regulatory scale. Part II provides an overview 
of the two disputes and their resolution under the Obama 
Administration, with particular attention to the scalar dynamics 
 
 10. Arizona Law Review’s 2008 symposium issue, for example, was devoted to climate 
federalism issues. See Carol M. Rose, Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of the States 
in a Future Federal Regime—An Introduction, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673 (2008). For additional 
discussions of federalism in the context of climate change, see BARRY G. RABE, The Politics of 
Climate Change, State Style, in STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1 (2004); Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We 
Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the 
United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (2006); Donald A. Brown, Thinking 
Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the 
Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the 
United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (1996); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, 
Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290–92 (2003); Ann 
E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479 (2008); Kirsten Engel, State and 
Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address 
a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 
URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It 
Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 53–65 (2003); 
Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value 
of State Autonomy in a Federalism System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008); Alice Kaswan, The 
Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for Federal, State, and Litigation 
Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a 
Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008); Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and 
Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian Provincial Policy Development, 14 
WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004); Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying 
Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of 
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008); William Andreen et al., 
Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: Why Federal, State, and Local Governments 
Must Continue to Partner, Center for Progressive Reform, May 29, 2008, http://progressive 
regulation.org/articles/Cooperative_Federalism_and_Climate_Change.pdf.  
 11. See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/4
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represented at each stage. Part III considers the broader policy and 
conceptual questions raised by these disputes for clean air regulation. 
Part IV concludes by exploring future possibilities for legal and 
policy approaches to multiscalar clean air regulation.  
I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND REGULATORY SCALE 
This Part provides an overview of the CAA’s approach to scale in 
order to frame the Article’s analysis of multiscalar clean air 
regulation. The CAA attempts to address the cross-cutting nature of 
air regulation by structuring regulatory interactions among the 
federal, state, and tribal governments in a fashion that has evolved 
through the amendment process over time. In so doing, it provides an 
ongoing example of dynamic federalism in action.
12
  
The Clean Air Act contains both top-down mandates with smaller-
scale implementation by states, tribes, and regions and bottom-up 
petition and citizen suit processes to request additional federal 
regulation or enforcement, which provide opportunities for both 
cooperation and conflict.
13
 As this Part details, the top-down 
mandates vary in the extent to which they preempt smaller-scale 
decision making and in the flexibility they give to states to implement 
them uniquely, but they are all structured to allow the possibility of 
smaller-scale divergence. The bottom-up processes provide a wide 
range of opportunities for nongovernmental and governmental actors 
to challenge the EPA’s implementation of the CAA. 
The CAA’s top-down mandates generally set minimum standards 
that states can choose to exceed. The broad savings clause established 
in CAA section 116 ensures that states with limited exceptions can 
―adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions 
of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or 
abatement of air pollution‖ as long as they are above the regulatory 
floors established in specific provisions.
14
 The primary exception to 
 
 12. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 174–87 (2006).  
 13. For detailed analyses of the CAA, see sources cited supra note 1. I have explored 
these dynamics in the motor vehicles emissions regulation context. See Osofsky, Diagonal 
Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5. 
 14. Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
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this approach, and one with great relevance to climate change 
regulation, as detailed below, occurs with respect to motor vehicles 
emissions regulation, an area in which the CAA mandates uniform 
national standards.
15
 However, even in that context, a waiver 
provision for California and states that wish to follow California 
provides the possibility for states to exceed federal standards.
16
 
The CAA, like other environmental statutes from its era, values 
opportunities for individuals, organizations, and governments to 
provide input into the regulatory process. Beyond the rulemaking 
processes that require public notice and comment, CAA § 304 
authorizes citizen suits by ―any person‖ to challenge (1) ―any 
person[’s]‖ violations of orders and standards, (2) the Administrator’s 
non-discretionary inaction, and (3) ―any person[’s]‖ failure to obtain 
or abide by permits in the construction or modification of emitting 
facilities.
17
 In addition, CAA § 307, the provision used effectively by 
the petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA, provides for judicial review 
of rulemaking petitions.
18
 
With these overarching structures as a base, nuanced regulatory 
provisions throughout the CAA establish the details of the dynamic 
interactions between the EPA and a myriad of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors at different levels. For example, states create 
implementation plans for meeting the national air quality standards. 
Those states that fail to meet national minimums are designated 
―nonattainment areas‖ and come under stricter federal control, which 
varies with respect to different pollutants.
19
 The cap-and-trade 
program to address the sulfur dioxide emissions that cause acid rain 
provides for allocations of emissions allowances to existing facilities, 
 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006). 
 17. CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
 18. CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2006).  
 19. For an in-depth analysis of these CAA provisions and their application, see Eileen 
Gauna, Major Sources of Criteria Pollutants in Nonattainment Areas: Balancing the Goals of 
Clean Air, Environmental Justice, and Industrial Development, 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 379 (1996). Ann Carlson’s analysis of iterative federalism and climate change also 
includes extensive discussion of these provisions. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and 
Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/4
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which then can be traded to allow for new facilities to come on line.
20
 
As discussed in Professor Buzbee’s Article in this symposium, this 
cap-and-trade system has been used as a model in proposed statutes 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
21
  
Although the merits of many of the CAA’s provisions have been 
debated extensively by policymakers and scholars,
22
 the statute’s 
many regulatory possibilities—whatever one thinks of them—
exemplify dynamic federalism interactions. The CAA, as it has been 
amended over time, provides opportunities for diagonal regulatory 
interactions; that is, approaches that are simultaneously vertical and 
horizontal. These include, for example, the above-discussed acid rain 
cap-and-trade program,
23
 a state waiver schema for more stringent 
regulation of motor vehicle emissions,
24
 and some of the litigation to 
force regulatory action.
25
  
These mechanisms are diagonal because they simultaneously 
involve vertical interactions between the EPA and states (and 
sometimes cities and nongovernmental organizations) and horizontal 
interactions among groups of actors at the same level.
26
 In the cap-
and-trade program, the EPA regulates emitters directly and through 
their interactions with one another.
27
 The waiver provision, as 
detailed in the next Part, involves a direct regulatory interaction 
between the EPA and California, paired with collaborative behavior 
between California and other states.
28
 In the most important CAA 
lawsuit regarding climate change, Massachusetts v. EPA, also 
 
 20. For an analysis of the CAA’s acid rain provisions, see Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the 
Clean Air Act: Lessons for Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program, 14 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2006); see also Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Warming Up to an International 
Greenhouse Gas Market: Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
221 (2001). 
 21. See Buzbee, supra note 2, at 60. 
 22. For examples of these discussions, see sources cited supra note 1. An in-depth 
assessment of each provision is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 23. See Goffman, supra note 20; Yelin-Kefer, supra note 20. 
 24. This waiver provision is located at 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006). 
 25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 5, at 591; Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5, at 55–56. 
 27. Cf. Goffman, supra note 20, at 182–87; Yelin-Kefer, supra note 20, at 227–30. 
 28. See infra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
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discussed in detail in the next Part, a wide range of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors lined up on opposing sides of the case.
29
 
In my view, these kinds of diagonal mechanisms are a critical 
piece of the future of environmental regulation because they help to 
foster necessary multiscalar approaches. By engaging multiple actors 
at different levels of government, diagonal federalism helps to match 
the cross-cutting nature of many environmental problems.
30
 The next 
Part explores this idea in more depth through the example of efforts 
to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean 
Air Act. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT, CARS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
The United States currently lacks a comprehensive statutory 
regime addressing climate change. As a result, many of the leading 
environmental statutes have become key focal points in debates over 
climate change regulation. The CAA’s motor vehicles emissions 
regulations in particular have spurred legal conflicts that have made 
their way to the Supreme Court and have influenced President 
Obama’s initial policy priorities. 
This Part analyzes two of these conflicts—the dispute that led to 
the current Massachusetts v. EPA implementation efforts, and the 
conflict over the California CAA waiver that resulted in the Obama 
administration ―National Plan‖—as windows into diagonal regulatory 
interactions under the Clean Air Act.
31
 Although my diagonal 
federalism analysis of these instances shares much in common with 
other recent dynamic federalism accounts, such as Ann Carlson’s 
scholarship on iterative federalism,
32
 Jessica Bulman-Pozen and 
Heather K. Gerken’s scholarship on noncooperative federalism,33 and 
Robert Schapiro’s scholarship on polyphonic federalism,34 its focus is 
 
 29. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 5, at 587–602; Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5, at 42–46. 
 31. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 32. Carlson, supra note 19. 
 33. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256 (2009).  
 34. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/4
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different. Specifically, I am concerned with how simultaneous 
horizontal and vertical interactions take place through iterative 
interactions that move between cooperation and conflict. Both 
examples not only involve interaction between leader states and the 
federal government, the players at the center of traditional federalism 
analysis, but also among a range of additional governmental and 
nongovernmental actors. Moreover, as I have traced in previous 
scholarship, the disputes involve a conflict over which levels of 
government should address the problem of climate change.
35
  
The administrative process that became the Supreme Court case 
Massachusetts v. EPA began when nongovernmental organizations 
submitted a rulemaking petition under CAA section 202(a)(1) 
requesting that greenhouse gas motor vehicle emissions be regulated 
as causing or contributing to ―air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.‖36 By the time the 
case reached the Supreme Court, twelve states, three cities, a U.S. 
territory, and thirteen nongovernmental organizations served as the 
appellants pushing for regulation, while ten other states and nineteen 
industry and utility groups joined the EPA as appellees.
37
 The 
appellees consistently argued that the problem was too large-scale 
and rife with scientific uncertainty for EPA regulation, while the 
appellants focused on the smaller scale impacts and the 
appropriateness of federal action.
38
 In ruling for the appellants, the 
 
 35. See Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 5, at 617–21; Hari M. 
Osofsky, Conclusion: Adjudicating Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE 
ACROSS SCALES: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns 
& Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009); Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233 (2007) [hereinafter Osofsky, Intersection of 
Scale, Science, and Law]. 
 36. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act 
is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).  
 37. For a complete list of parties, see International Center for Technology Assessment, 
Global Warming Petitioners, http://icta.org/doc/SupCtPetitionersBriefFinal%208-30-06.pdf. 
 38. For example, with respect to standing, see Brief for the Federal Respondent at 13, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120); Brief for Respondents Alliance of 
Automobile Mfrs., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, National Automobile Dealers Ass’n, Truck Mfrs. Ass’n 
at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120); Reply Brief at 2–3, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120). With respect to substantive claims, 
see Brief for Respondent CO2 Litigation Grp. at 20, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(No. 05–1120); Brief for Petitioners at 29, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 
05–1120); Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Mfrs., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, Nat’l 
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Supreme Court forced the EPA to regulate or provide better 
justification for failing to regulate.
39
 After many months of stalling by 
the Bush administration EPA, the Obama administration EPA already 
has issued an endangerment finding, which could ultimately lead to 
extensive CAA regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas 
emissions.
40
  
The state waiver dispute resulted from an application under 
section 209(a) of the CAA, which provides California with an 
exception to the federal preemption of state motor vehicle emissions 
standards and allows other states to choose between California and 
federal standards.
41
 In response to the 2002 passage of Assembly Bill 
1493,
42
 the California Air Resources Board (―CARB‖) in 2004 
promulgated vehicle emissions regulations aimed to maximize 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions;
43
 then, in 2005, CARB 
petitioned the EPA for a waiver of preemption for these standards.
44
 
After extensive efforts by petitioners to obtain an EPA response to 
the waiver request, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson announced 
his denial at the end of 2007.
45
 This decision resulted in multiple 
 
Automobile Dealers Ass’n, Truck Mfrs. Ass’n at 38–39, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (No. 05–1120); Brief for the Federal Respondent at 27–30, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05–1120); Reply at 2–3, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 
05–1120). I have analyzed these dynamics in depth with respect to both standing and 
substantive claims in Osofsky, Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law, supra note 35. 
 39. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533–35. 
 40. See Endangerment Finding, supra note 6. Although an endangerment finding provides 
the basis for regulation, the EPA makes a point of clarifying on its website that the finding does 
not itself constitute regulation: ―These findings do not themselves impose any requirements on 
industry or other entities. However, this action is a prerequisite to finalizing the EPA’s 
proposed greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty vehicles, which EPA proposed in a 
joint proposal including the Department of Transportation’s proposed CAFÉ standards on 
September 15, 2009.‖ U.S. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for 
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, http://epa.gov/climatechange/ 
endangerment.html (last visited June 10, 2010).  
 41. See Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006); see also Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 § 129(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006). I have analyzed this dispute in depth 
in Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 5. 
 42. The legislation introduced as Assembly Bill 1493 became effective Jan. 1, 2003. See 
Vehicular Emissions: Greenhouse Gases, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 696–701 (West) (codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2003)). 
 43. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2008). 
 44. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Request for Waiver of 
Federal Preemption and Notice of Public Hearing, 72 Fed. Reg. 21,260 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
 45. See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/4
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lawsuits and political efforts in Congress to overturn the denial.
46
 The 
final resolution came shortly after President Obama took office in 
2009, with the EPA’s reconsideration of the decision and grant of the 
waiver.
47
 This waiver grant paralleled efforts by the Obama 
administration to set more rigorous national standards, and California 
agreed on a plan to harmonize state and federal vehicle emissions 
standards by 2012.
48
  
Although both Massachusetts v. EPA and the California waiver 
dispute involve the regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas 
emissions, their focus is fundamentally different. The petitioners in 
Massachusetts v. EPA aimed to force the federal government, 
specifically the EPA, to act under authority granted to it by the 
CAA.
49
 In contrast, the state waiver dispute was about whether 
California and other states could exceed national standards.
50
 The 
first conflict thus was a bottom-up effort, which faced opposition 
 
Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epa-
letter.pdf; EPA Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New 
Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 46. For examples of efforts to reverse the denial in courts, see Petition for Review of 
Decision of the U.S. EPA, California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2008), 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epapetition-1.pdf; Motion for Leave to 
Intervene as Petitioners, California ex rel. Brown v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 
2008), http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest_news/releases/feb_2008/EPA_regulation. 
pdf; Complaint for Injunctive Relief Under the Freedom of Information Act, California v. EPA, 
No. 08-00735 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2008), http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/EPA_FOIA_ 
complaint.pdf; Protective Petition for Review, California v. EPA, No. 08-1178 (D.C. Cir. May 
5, 2008), http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/legal/docs/petition_08-1178.pdf; see 
also Office of the Attorney General, State of California, California’s Motor Vehicle Global 
Warming Regulations, http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/motorvehicle.php (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). For examples of efforts to reverse and investigate the denial in Congress, see Reducing 
Global Warming Pollution from Vehicles Act of 2008, S. 2555, 110th Cong. (2008); Right to 
Clean Vehicles Act, H.R. 5560, 110th Cong. (2008); Richard Simon, Hearing Grows Warm for 
EPA Chief, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A13; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND 
GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110TH CONG., MEMORANDUM ON EPA’S DENIAL OF THE CALIFORNIA 
WAIVER (2008), http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080519131253.pdf. 
 47. For a discussion of the Obama administration’s reconsideration and grant of the 
waiver, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 48. For examples of the Obama administration’s regulatory actions thus far, see supra 
note 6 and accompanying text. For more on the effort to harmonize state and federal emissions 
standards, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 49. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). See also supra notes 36–40 and 
accompanying text.  
 50. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
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from both the federal government and some state governments, to 
force top-down federal action. The second conflict was a bottom-up 
effort under a top-down, federal-level preemption/waiver system to 
support smaller-scale regulatory behavior, which in turn has 
pressured the federal government to regulate further in a larger-scale, 
top-down manner.
51
 
In their cross-cutting dynamism, these two examples point the 
way for new directions in environmental law utilizing traditional 
environmental statutes. They demonstrate not only the complexity 
and difficulty of relying upon the CAA as a primary vehicle for 
regulating climate change, but also the statute’s potential to be 
responsive to new problems and create needed interactions across 
levels of government. A key component of this responsiveness, in my 
view, is the way in which it allows for evolving formulations of 
diagonal regulatory interactions over time. I have elsewhere 
identified four key dimensions within which diagonal regulatory 
efforts vary: (1) scale (small v. large); (2) axis (vertical v. horizontal); 
(3) hierarchy (top down v. bottom up); and (4) cooperativeness 
(cooperation v. conflict).
52
 What is striking about both cases is that 
their skews within these four dimensions vary dramatically over time, 
as noted in the above descriptions. The relevant mechanisms of the 
CAA allow complex regulatory dynamics that involve state-
dominated action and federal decision making, state-federal and 
state-state interactions, top-down and bottom-up pressure, and 
conflict and cooperation at different moments. These patterns raise 
important questions for the future, which Part III engages. 
III. CORE QUESTIONS FOR DYNAMIC FEDERALIST APPROACHES TO 
REGULATING AIR 
This Part draws from the case example of the motor vehicle 
emissions regulation disputes to illustrate core dilemmas for future 
dynamic federalist approaches to regulating air. Such approaches 
must grapple with the changed conditions Professor Tarlock outlines 
 
 51. I have described the dynamics in these two cases in a similar fashion in Hari M. 
Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate change Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 1, 23 (2010). 
 52. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5, at 46–47.  
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in his introduction to this symposium,
53
 and the ways in which 
environmental problems are changing. More specifically, this Part 
highlights four issues based on the example of evolving diagonal 
climate change regulation under the CAA that future environmental 
regulation needs to continue to explore how to address better: (1) the 
interaction among science, scale, and law; (2) the limits of 
―environmentalism‖ as an enclosing construct; (3) the importance of 
possibilities for engaging conflict; and (4) the difficulties of 
diagonals. 
A. Interaction among Science, Scale, and Law 
First, the disputes exemplify the use of scientific uncertainty and 
regulatory rescaling both to block smaller scale regulatory efforts and 
to push for their expansion. Such a pattern is not unique to this 
dispute; it manifests throughout climate change litigation and in 
environmental regulation more broadly. My previous 
interdisciplinary scholarship integrates the work of Holly Doremus 
on science and politics and of geographer Nathan Sayre on the 
geography and ecology of scale in order to dissect these patterns.
54
 
My hope is that such an exploration might help us to construct better 
future environmental regulatory regimes with more sensitivity to the 
interaction between science and scale. 
For example, with respect to climate change, we have to deal with 
the greater scientific uncertainty at smaller spatial and time scales 
against the sticky backdrop of law subdivided into different units and 
levels of government.
55
 This dilemma was manifest in the arguments 
 
 53. Tarlock, supra note 4. 
 54. See Osofsky, Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law, supra note 35; see also Holly 
Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t 
Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, 
Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource 
Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005) [hereinafter Doremus, 
Science Plays Defense]; Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered 
Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); Nathan F. Sayre, 
Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for Integration, 29 PROGRESS 
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 281 (2005). 
 55. I have explored this dilemma in Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra 
note 5. For geographers’ analyses of scalar fixity and fluidity, see Neil Brenner, Between Fixity 
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made throughout both the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation and the 
California waiver dispute. Judges and policymakers grappled with 
whether that smaller scale uncertainty was too great for national-level 
and state-level action, and whether a broad federal statute focused on 
air was an appropriate vehicle for accomplishing that action.
56
 The 
Obama administration will continue to confront these issues as it uses 
the CAA as a cooperative tool in motor vehicles emissions 
regulation. EPA efforts will evolve in tandem with emerging 
scientific understanding, and a potential future climate change 
statutory regime will interact with and perhaps preempt some of these 
CAA approaches.
57
  
B. Limits of “Environmentalism” as an Enclosing Construct 
Second, because climate change is so deeply intertwined with our 
carbon economy and way of life, addressing it through traditional 
 
and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial 
Scales, 16 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 459, 461 (1998); Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of 
Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics, 17 
POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 21 (1998); David Delaney & Helga Leitner, The Political Construction of 
Scale, 16 POL. GEOGRAPHY 93, 93 (1997); Andrew Herod, Scale: The Local and the Global, in 
KEY CONCEPTS IN GEOGRAPHY 229, 234–36 (Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Rice & Gill 
Valentine eds., 2003); Deborah G. Martin, Transcending the Fixity of Jurisdictional Scale, 18 
POL. GEOGRAPHY 33 (1999); Anssi Paasi, Place and Region: Looking through the Prism of 
Scale, 28 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 536, 542–43 (2004); Erik Swyngedouw, Excluding the 
Other: The Production of Scale and Scaled Politics, in GEOGRAPHIES OF ECONOMIES 167, 169–
70 (Roger Lee & Jane Wills eds., 1997); and Erik Swyngedouw, Neither Global nor Local: 
“Glocalization” and the Politics of Scale, in SPACES OF GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE 
POWER OF THE LOCAL 137, 140–42 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997). For discussions of the greater 
scientific uncertainty at smaller scales, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING 
PROGRESS OF THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM: METHODS AND PRELIMINARY 
RESULTS 5 (2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309108268; Patrick 
J. Bartlein, Professor, Dep’t of Geography, Univ. of Or., Remarks at Seminar on Reading the 
Fourth IPCC Assessment Report 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007) (author’s notes, on file with author). 
 56. See supra notes 36–40, 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 57. For discussions of potential climate change legislation, see Buzbee, Clean Air Act 
Dynamism and Disappointments, supra note 2; Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative 
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 123 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Legislation in Context, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245 (2008); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Cap-and-Trade 
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); Kenneth R. 
Richards & Stephanie Hayes Richards, The Evolution and Anatomy of Recent Climate Change 
Bills in the U.S. Senate: Critique and Recommendations (July 1, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368903. 
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environmental mechanisms, such as the CAA waiver process, is 
challenging.
58
 Environmental law generally and ―clean air‖ regulation 
in particular cannot be captured simply through improving a federal 
statutory regime we call environmental law, even though that regime 
helps to address complex environmental problems like climate 
change. Rather, environmental analysis needs to engage the range of 
laws and social, economic, and cultural decisions that undergird these 
problems and their solutions. Our future environmental regimes need 
to value the strong federal statutes we have created, improve upon 
them, and realize that they are only part of multiscalar environmental 
regulation. 
Interdisciplinary adaptive management approaches, such as the 
one taken by J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman in their recent work on 
complex environmental problems (including climate change), 
represent a helpful variation on such an effort.
59
 These approaches 
attempt to engage ―ecological, economic, and institutional systems‖ 
simultaneously in a ―cross-scale, interdisciplinary, and dynamic‖ 
fashion, which Lance Gunderson, C.S. Holling, and Don Ludwig 
have termed ―panarchy.‖60 But translating these approaches into 
policy contexts, like reassessment and implementation of the CAA, 
raises practical questions about how to structure law in ways that 
capture such complexity. The conflicts over the CAA motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation illustrate this conundrum. These 
disputes and the regulations resulting from them are establishing 
specific tailpipe emissions standards and determining the levels of 
 
 58. For analyses of the problem of climate change and complexities of solutions, see 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm; 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-
wg2.htm [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm [hereinafter IPCC, MITIGATION]; NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov. 
uk/stern_review_report.htm. 
 59. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in 
the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
 60. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of 
Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND 
NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
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government allowed to create and enforce them. Although a wide 
range of actors—from automobile corporations to individual 
drivers—have an interest in what those standards are and seek to 
effect their implementation, the motor vehicles emissions regulations 
themselves cannot fully capture that nuance; instead, they simply set 
limits on how much carbon dioxide can come out of new cars.
61
 As 
environmental law continues to develop, it will repeatedly confront 
the stickiness of law and the limits of functional legal capacity to 
address ecologically, economically, socially, and institutionally 
complex problems. 
C. Importance of Possibilities for Engaging Conflict 
The Massachusetts v. EPA and California waiver disputes and the 
attention they have garnered play an important regulatory role and 
reinforce the value of not just cooperation but also conflict for 
dynamic federalist approaches. The Massachusetts v. EPA lawsuit 
provided a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental actors 
the opportunity to weigh in on the appropriateness of the CAA as a 
vehicle for regulating climate change. The Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the case and the Obama administration’s efforts at 
implementation have put pressure on Congress to take action and 
have played a significant cultural signaling role in reinforcing the 
importance of the problem of climate change.
62
 The waiver 
mechanism and the various means of challenging its denial allowed 
for an expression of different views on climate regulation; such 
expression has assisted in the construction of a cooperative regulatory 
framework over time. The Obama administration’s National Plan not 
only involves collaboration between the federal government and 
leader states, but also has the endorsement of automobile 
companies.
63
 The disagreements over how to regulate and the 
 
 61. See Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking, supra note 6. 
 62. The signaling impact of the decision was reinforced by other events that same spring, 
such as Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change receiving the Nobel Peace 
Prize. See The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http: nobelprize.org nobel_prizes peace laureates  
2007  (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  
 63. Press Release, Auto Alliance, Automakers Support President in Development of 
National Program for Autos (May 18, 2009), available at http://www.autoalliance.org/ 
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mechanisms for expressing divergent views under the CAA put 
pressure on regulators at multiple levels to improve their approaches.  
Emerging federalism scholarship recognizes the importance of 
interactions like those that took place in these two disputes over the 
use of the CAA to mitigate climate change. As we look to the future, 
we should reevaluate what has worked about the processes built into 
the CAA and other environmental laws to allow for challenges, and 
consider what conflict mechanisms are most helpful in which 
contexts. We also have to look backward as we look forward, 
considering how longstanding mechanisms like nuisance actions 
should fit into the evolving statutory regime. These are pressing 
questions because the potential statutory regime on climate change 
emerges in a context in which the Second Circuit has validated the 
viability of climate nuisance suits and other circuits are considering 
this issue
64
 and in which the Obama administration is using existing 
statutory frameworks like the CAA to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions more aggressively.
65
  
D. Difficulties of Diagonals 
Fully integrated formal diagonal federalism, in which all relevant 
actors are simultaneously included in environmental statutory and 
regulatory regimes, may be hard to achieve, but many possibilities for 
partial diagonal regulation exist. In particular, as noted above, I am 
focusing in my research on four dimensions within which partial 
integration might occur: scale, axis, hierarchy, and cooperativeness. 
By breaking down integrative possibilities into these dimensions, we 
 
index.cfm?objectid=55B4BAFF-1D09-317F-BBB0DA0B7783C956 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
 64. See Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2009). The Fifth 
Circuit initially reached a similar conclusion, see Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th 
Cir. 2009), but then voted to rehear the case en banc, see Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 
209 (5th Cir. 2010). Upon rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit found that it lacked a quorum 
due to recusals, and a majority of the remaining judges held that the appellate decision was 
therefore vacated. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756, 2010 WL 2136658 (5th Cir. 
May 28, 2010). An additional climate nuisance case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
following a district court dismissal on justifiability grounds. See Native Village of Kivalina v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 65. See supra notes 36–40, 44–48 and accompanying text. 
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can build regimes that achieve fully integrated diagonal regulation 
through combinations of different partially integrative strategies.
66
 
As discussed in Part II, the Clean Air Act already contains many 
partially integrative strategies. The two disputes highlight how skews 
within the dimensions vary over time and suggest ways in which 
different CAA mechanisms might build upon one another. The 
simultaneous conflicts put combined bottom-up conflictual pressure 
on the Bush administration and created pressure for dual regulatory 
action on federal and state scales.
67
 The Obama administration’s 
responsiveness to both the Supreme Court ruling and the waiver 
request has helped it to make strides in creating an integrated multi-
level approach to motor vehicle emissions regulation under the CAA, 
even in a context in which climate change legislation moves slowly 
through Congress.
68
 Future iterations of such regulation, whether 
under the CAA or some other environmental statute, should consider 
and reconsider where regulation should be along each vector to build 
the most effective regime. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF MULTISCALAR CLEAN AIR STRATEGIES 
This Article concludes with a brief reflection on how the current 
complexities of environmental governance frame possibilities for the 
future of multiscalar clean air strategies. The difficulties of achieving 
diagonals, and the complex dynamics around emerging ―air‖ 
problems like climate change, suggest the need to construct a range 
of regulatory interactions that can complement one another. The 
CAA models the possibilities and limitations of such interactions 
through the range of approaches it takes across scales and through 
mechanisms like the state waiver for motor vehicle emissions 
regulation that allow for dynamism. 
Creative regulation needs to be effective in addressing these 
issues, and the CAA provides a cautionary tale of how hard future air 
regulation will be—even when we attempt innovative regulatory 
 
 66. See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 5, at 64. 
 67. For an in-depth analysis of how motor vehicles emissions regulation skews within the 
four dimensions and the implications of those patterns for the Obama administration, see id. at 
64–72. 
 68. See id. at 19–22. 
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structures—with support and resistance at multiple levels of 
government. Environmental law must navigate intertwined ecological 
and socio-legal forces; at the same time, it must create effective 
prescriptions that can be feasibly implemented. As policymakers 
build upon the Clean Air Act over time, both through amending the 
Act itself and through complementary legislation, their constructs 
need to reflect the ways in which these nuances of scale interact with 
our federalist structure. 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
